Negative Brief: NATO Exit – bad idea

By "Coach Vance" Trefethen

***Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially reform its foreign aid.***

AFF plan has the US exit from NATO. This NEG brief shows that a US pullout means the end of NATO, which leads to multiple disadvantages of US and world security being harmed.

Negative: NATO Exit – bad idea 3

INHERENCY 3

1. US reducing 3

US has already dramatically reduced its military presence in Europe 3

2. Allies increasing (answer to "Europe free-rides on US taxpayers for defense") 3

NATO allies are increasing defense spending 3

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE 3

1. A/T "Europeans too dependent on U.S." 3

Turn: That's good, not bad. It means we get greater influence for good in the world and reduces the cost of our foreign policy 3

2. A/T "Europeans don't support us / don't carry their weight" 4

They spend plenty, plus they support the US like no other countries do 4

DISADVANTAGES 4

Big Link to Everything: NATO is doomed without the US 4

1. Russian aggression in Europe 4

Link: US presence in Europe with NATO provides assurance to allies and deterrent value 5

Brink: Independence of post-Soviet states is at risk from Russian aggression. 5

Link & Brink: US pullout of NATO greatly increases risk of Russian invasion 5

Link: It's not about how much they spend, it's about coordination. Europe could defeat Russian attack, but only if the U.S. coordinates their efforts 5

Impact 1: Loss of US national security – from European instability 6

Impact 2: Existential threat. Russia can destroy NATO member states and NATO must prevent it 6

2. Loss of trans-Atlantic cooperation 6

Link: Cooperation strengthens American power 6

Link & Impact: Net benefits of working multilaterally through NATO outweigh the costs 7

Impact 1: Cost. Strong NATO has huge benefits for the US by bringing in our allies to share burdens in joint operations 7

Cost Impact: Complex military interventions cost less when we have international cooperation 7

Impact 2: Better pursuit of American interests with NATO than without it 8

Impact 3: Today’s transatlantic community is indispensable for managing multiple world problems. 8

Impact: Increased risk of war. U.S. military power maintains world order and reduces the chance of war. 9

3. Loss of Multilateralism & Legitimacy 9

Link: Withdrawal from NATO is bad because unilateral actions lack legitimacy - NATO is the best multilateral option 9

Link: NATO confers legitimacy on military operations 9

Brink: We can't have effective multilateral foreign policy without NATO 10

Impact: Solutions to nuclear proliferation and terrorism require legitimacy 10

Definition of legitimacy 10

4. Friendly Fire. 10

Coordination with NATO improves cooperation with allies, which means less risk of friendly-fire during war time 10

5. Risk to the Global Commons. 11

Link: US+NATO needed to protect the global commons 11

Impact: Protection of the open seas is critical to prosperity and security. Advanced economies are vulnerable to any maritime disruption 11

6. WMD’s and Terrorism. 12

Europe would be more vulnerable to WMDs and terrorism, regardless of their defense spending, because without NATO they lose access to US technological cooperation 12

7. Negative net benefits / All harms get worse 12

Net benefits overwhelmingly favor US staying in NATO. All the complaints about Europe and defense get worse without NATO 12

Works Cited 13

Negative: NATO Exit – bad idea

INHERENCY

1. US reducing

US has already dramatically reduced its military presence in Europe

Aleksandr Khramchikhin 2018 (deputy director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow) 25 Jan 2018 " Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military Balance" <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/rethinking-danger-of-escalation-russia-nato-military-balance-pub-75346>

The size of the U.S. military presence in Europe has decreased to an even greater degree since the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of 2016, the U.S. military had [deployed ten brigades in Germany](http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/factsheets/default.htm), but only two of these (the 2nd cavalry regiment and 12th combat aviation brigade) were [actual fighting elements](http://www.eur.army.mil/21TSC/units.asp); the remaining eight were [purely support units](http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/units.htm). One American airborne brigade is deployed in Italy. In 2017, the [U.S. Air Force component](http://www.usafe.af.mil/Units) deployed in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom had nine wings, but these are primarily support units, and there are only six fighting squadrons. These cuts in military hardware are consistent with a general tendency in the West (to a greater extent in Europe than in the United States) to embrace ideas of hedonism, pacifism, postmodernism, tolerance, and political correctness.

2. Allies increasing (answer to "Europe free-rides on US taxpayers for defense")

NATO allies are increasing defense spending

Judy Dempsey 2018. (nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor of its Strategic Europe blog) 6 July 2018 "Trump may be doing the European Union and NATO a big favor" WASHINGTON POST <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/07/06/trump-may-be-doing-the-european-union-and-nato-a-big-favor/?utm_term=.4db5041b56a5>

As for NATO, the summit looks set to be a nightmare for the member states. Trump will almost certainly be lecturing them once again about their alleged failures to meet their commitments. One wonders whether he will be pleased when he’s informed NATO countries are spending more on defense. In 2017, European allies and Canada in 2017 spent an [estimated $300 billion](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_03/20180315_180315-pr2018-16-en.pdf), up from $272 billion in 2014. As for reaching the 2 percent of gross domestic product on their military budgets that was agreed during the 2014 summit in Wales, progress has been slow but steady. On average, Canada and the European nations [have reached](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-spending/european-allies-boost-defense-spending-most-still-miss-natos-u-s-backed-goal-idUSKCN1GR1UL?il=0) 1.45 percent of GDP (compared with the 3.57 percent spent by the United States).

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. A/T "Europeans too dependent on U.S."

Turn: That's good, not bad. It means we get greater influence for good in the world and reduces the cost of our foreign policy

Kori Schake 2017. (research fellow at the Hoover Institution and teaches at Stanford) NATO Without America?25 May 2017 <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/05/25/nato-without-america/>

That countries invite us into their problems is one of the great assets of the American-led order. It reinforces our power to be the guarantor of the order, giving us greater influence over the rules that are set. American hegemony has been unique in setting rules that advantage others as well as us—a mutually beneficial outcome that makes sustaining that order less expensive overall. If we had to impose rules, rather than rely on the attractiveness of our policies, American power would be a much costlier proposition.

2. A/T "Europeans don't support us / don't carry their weight"

They spend plenty, plus they support the US like no other countries do

Kori Schake 2017. (research fellow at the Hoover Institution and teaches at Stanford) NATO Without America?25 May 2017 <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/05/25/nato-without-america/>

Most of America’s capable regional allies around the world have significant limitations in extending operations beyond their immediate regions. Furthermore, their spending levels overall fail to impress. If we rank countries by per capita military spending, Saudi Arabia far outstrips all other states at $6,909; the United States ranks only 4th with $1,859 per person (Singapore and Israel both spend more). Rounding out the top 15 per-person spenders on defense, though, are seven more NATO allies (Norway, Greece, Britain, France, Luxembourg, Denmark, and the Netherlands). Wan as NATO allies’ spending often seems, it still stacks up favorably against other countries’, and NATO allies are unusual in their willingness to engage beyond their region in support of U.S. efforts.

DISADVANTAGES

Big Link to Everything: NATO is doomed without the US

**[Note: This can be used to link the AFF plan to any “abolish NATO” disads you want to run. If NATO is doomed without the US, then withdrawal from NATO would create the same Disads as abolishing NATO.]**

Janusz Onyszkiewicz 2003. (former Minister of National Defense, Poland) presentation given at the State Department Conference on NATO, Washington DC, Oct.28-29th, 2003, “THE CENTRAL ISSUES FOR NATO” <http://csm.org.pl/en/others?download=104:the-central-issues-for-nato&start=20>

Naturally, NATO cannot be something else then what the member countries want it to be. It applies first of all to the US. “Tool box” concepts reduces NATO from an important forum of transatlantic political debate to a minor technical instrument of American policy. However, if the US loses an interest in NATO, the Alliance will be doomed. Without US leadership, NATO very likely will not be a dynamic, innovative structure and soon will become another WEU. On the other hand, strong and attractive NATO should not be seen as detrimental to justified and legitimate ambitions to make CFSP and ESDP important factors.

1. Russian aggression in Europe

Link: NATO provides the most effective security for its members

Philip H. Gordon 2012. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs) Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC March 1, 2012 “The United States and Europe: Meeting Global Challenges**”** <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/185064.htm>

Today NATO has 28 members, dozens of partners across the globe, a proven track record of providing stability within Europe and beyond its borders. NATO’s ongoing missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and off the horn of Africa as well as its recent operation in Libya demonstrate its significant contributions to global security. At a time of budgetary austerity across the industrialized world, it is worth remembering that NATO has proven to be the most successful alliance in history and provides the most effective security for its members.

Link: US presence in Europe with NATO provides assurance to allies and deterrent value

Jamie Shea 2012. (NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges) Keeping NATO Relevant, Apr 2012 [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/keeping-nato-relevant/acl9#](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/keeping-nato-relevant/acl9)

NATO will thus need to return to scenarios reminiscent of the Cold War in some respects: with plans for U.S. forces to return to Europe in a crisis situation honed through regular intensive exercises. The U.S. forces remaining in Europe must be configured to support this training. This would be helped if the United States left a disproportionate number of officers from all four U.S. services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) at the key U.S. training facilities, such as Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr, or at NATO’s European headquarters. Some of these should be Article 5, collective defense exercises to provide reassurance to allies, particularly to those on the periphery of the Alliance where the conventional military balance remains unfavorable. Exercises also demonstrate NATO’s cohesion and resolve, having in themselves a deterrent value.

Brink: Independence of post-Soviet states is at risk from Russian aggression.

Zbigniew Brzezinski 2008. (National Security Advisor to Pres. Carter) Time Magazine, 14 Aug 2008, “Staring Down the Russians,” <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1832846,00.html>

“The stakes are high. Ultimately, the independence of the post-Soviet states is at risk. Russia seems committed to the notion that there should be some sort of supranational entity, governed from the Kremlin, that would oversee much of the former Soviet territories. This attitude reflects in part the intense nationalistic mood that now permeates Russia's political élite. Vladimir Putin, former President and now Prime Minister, is riding this nationalist wave, exploiting it politically and propagating it with the Russian public. Some now even talk of a renewed Russian military presence in Cuba as a form of retaliation against the U.S. for its support of the independence of the post-Soviet states.”

Link & Brink: US pullout of NATO greatly increases risk of Russian invasion

Aletha Adu 2017 (journalist) 24 Jan 2017 "Europe at risk of INVASION FROM PUTIN if Trump pulls troops from continent, general warns" EXPRESS <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/757990/Europe-risk-Putin-Russia-invasion-Trump-pulls-US-troops-Nato-obsolete-Hodges-May-Merkel>

EUROPE is at risk of invasion from Vladimir Putin if Donald Trump withdraws US troops from Nato's operation on Russia's border, a senior defence general based in Europe has chillingly warned. Ben Hodges, the Commander of the US Army in Europe, stressed Putin would be ready to "exploit" America's "vulnerability" and "weakness" once they pulled out from the treaty.

Link: It's not about how much they spend, it's about coordination. Europe could defeat Russian attack, but only if the U.S. coordinates their efforts

Kori Schake 2017. (research fellow at the Hoover Institution and teaches at Stanford) NATO Without America?25 May 2017 <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/05/25/nato-without-america/>

Russian aggression is reviving interest in European security, but not diminishing other claims on American attention. Part of the reason why Trump’s criticism of European defense resonates is that challenges in Europe look manageable with the power Europeans could muster on their own. Could Britain, France, Poland, and Germany really not bring enough power to bear to defeat a Russian invasion of a Baltic state? If not, should they not quickly mobilize greater military forces—or more creatively use the nuclear and conventional forces they already have—instead of relying so heavily on American guarantees? Russia is not the peer of any of those countries (with the possible exception of Poland), much less all of them combined. This plaint misses an important point. In aggregate, Europe’s military assets look formidable, but only the United States can bring them together in an effective fighting ensemble. We are the mainframe, so to speak, and the allies plug into that—whether we are talking about intelligence, logistics, lift, or half a dozen other crucial functions in contemporary warfighting. However well equipped they look on paper, our allies strain to coordinate their assets without us.

Impact 1: Loss of US national security – from European instability

Aletha Adu 2017 (journalist) 24 Jan 2017 "Europe at risk of INVASION FROM PUTIN if Trump pulls troops from continent, general warns" EXPRESS <https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/757990/Europe-risk-Putin-Russia-invasion-Trump-pulls-US-troops-Nato-obsolete-Hodges-May-Merkel>

The decorated General Hodges, who was wounded in Iraq, slammed Trump's previous comment branding Nato as obsolete because of America's "own stability and security" was tied "to the stability and security in Europe." Theresa May has promised to stress the "importance of Nato as the bulwark of our defence" during her meeting with the President at the White House later this week.

Impact 2: Existential threat. Russia can destroy NATO member states and NATO must prevent it

Luke Coffey & Daniel Kochis 2018 (Coffey is Director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Kochis is Policy Analyst in European Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Davis Institute.) Addressing the Threat from Russia Must Be Front and Center at the 2018 NATO Summit 29 June 2018 <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/addressing-the-threat-russia-must-be-front-and-center-the-2018-nato-summit>

The United States should ensure that the threat from Russia is a specific focus of the Brussels Summit and the top agenda item for the leaders assembled. Russia continues to represent the only existential threat to member states; NATO must send a strong signal that it is strengthening deterrence measures explicitly in response to Russia.

**END QUOTE. They go on to say later in the same context QUOTE:**

Russia represents a real and potentially existential threat to NATO members in Eastern and Central Europe, and a significant threat and challenge to the rest of the Alliance. As NATO continues its transition back to collective defense, now is not the time to be coy about why defense is necessary. Allies should talk openly and frankly about the threat from Russia, and which steps are being taken to deter Russia, and bolster defensive capabilities.

2. Loss of trans-Atlantic cooperation

**NATO as a means of promoting cooperation among allies’ results in better outcomes than if we tried to do the same foreign policy goals without NATO**

Link: Cooperation strengthens American power

Dr. Ivo H. Daalder & Dr. James Lindsay 2003. (Daalder - PhD political science; was an associate professor at the Univ. of Maryland School of Public Affairs, where he was director of research at the Center for International and Security Studies. Lindsay - AB in economics and political science from the University of Michigan and an MA, MPhil, and PhD from Yale Univ.; former fellow at the Center for International Affairs and the Center for Science and International Affairs, both at Harvard Univ.; International Affairs Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations) “The Globalization of Politics: American Foreign Policy for a New Century” Winter 2003, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-globalization-of-politics-american-foreign-policy-for-a-new-century/>

Finally, cooperation can extend the life of American primacy. Working with others can spread the costs of action over a wider array of actors, enabling the United States to do more with less. By creating international regimes and organizations Washington can imbed its interests and values in institutions that will shape and constrain countries for decades, regardless of the vicissitudes of American power. And cooperation can build bonds with other countries, lessening the chances of cultural and political tactics that can over the years sap U.S. power.

Link & Impact: Net benefits of working multilaterally through NATO outweigh the costs

Dr. Dave Auerswald, Prof. Steve Saideman, Dr. Michael Tierney 2007. (Auerswald - Professor of Security Studies at the National War College; Ph.D. political science from the Univ of California, San Diego. Saideman - prof. of political science, McGill University, Canada; Tierney - Ph.D. political science from the Univ of California, San Diego; prof of polit. sci. College of William & Mary) The Perils of Multilateralism? American Influence in Multilateral Interventions,   
<http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Delegation%20during%20Conflict%20APSA%2006.doc>

The current Bush administration has strongly preferred to avoid institutionalized collective action in its war on terrorism in Afghanistan. One apparent concern motivating this unilateralism is that the U.S. would have to accommodate its allies (bargaining costs), which might be more difficult in the aftermath of the Iraq War. Still, the Kosovo case shows that American control over NATO multilateral efforts can be substantial (or even overwhelming); hence, neither agency costs nor bargaining costs should necessarily drive U.S. policy decisions. On balance, multilateralism seems more beneficial to the U.S than the alternative of unilateral intervention.

Impact 1: Cost. Strong NATO has huge benefits for the US by bringing in our allies to share burdens in joint operations

Luke Coffey 2012. (Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at The Heritage Foundation.; was special advisor to British Minister of Defense; master of science degree in European Union Politics from the London School of Economics; served as a Captain in the US Army as part of the Southern European Task Force and deployed to Afghanistan) 24 Feb 2012 Shrinking America’s Global Reach: U.S. Military Bases in Europe Remain Vital <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/ib3516.pdf>

It is also in America’s interest to see a relevant and strong NATO. U.S. forces play a major role in the capacity building of key European allies. This has huge benefits for the United States. In 2010, the U.S. carried out 33 major multinational training exercises involving 50,000 troops from 40 countries in Europe. U.S. forces also help European allies prepare for missions like the one in Afghanistan. For example, today there is a Georgian infantry battalion fighting alongside U.S. Marines in Helmand province, one of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan. The more America trains its allies to carry out challenging missions such as those in Afghanistan, the better the burden is shared with its partners.

Cost Impact: Complex military interventions cost less when we have international cooperation

Stefano Recchia 2011. (PhD candidate, Columbia University) “Limited Liability Multilateralism: The American Military, Armed Intervention, and IOs” (brackets added) <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=15&ved=0CD0QFjAEOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fdownload%2Ffedora_content%2Fdownload%2Fac%3A140135%2FCONTENT%2FRecchia_columbia_0054D_10402.pdf&ei=DoaZT7PfL8nL0QXXzp3vBQ&usg=AFQjCNE0JliWxsSI3QjCgcYad9z5Dojhww&sig2=6zHJHDcO8ptY0FOuOjhghw>

The endorsement of relevant IOs [international organizations], obtained before the launch of offensive operations, locks in international support and thereby reduces the costs to Washington of successfully implementing complex interventions, especially those that require open-ended troop commitments for post-combat peacekeeping and stabilization. Put differently, IO endorsement obtained from the outset facilitates burden sharing in the long run and therefore limits American liability. As former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott sums it up:  
Particularly when it comes to intervening in either civil wars or failed states, it is much more sustainable if you have regional IOs and coalitions that are backed by global institutions to carry these things out, rather than having the United States with its much flaunted lift capability and military force come half around the world.

Impact 2: Better pursuit of American interests with NATO than without it

Dr. Dave Auerswald, Prof. Steve Saideman, Dr. Michael Tierney 2007. (Auerswald - Professor of Security Studies at the National War College; Ph.D. political science from the Univ of California, San Diego. Saideman - prof. of political science, McGill University, Canada; Tierney - Ph.D. political science from the Univ of California, San Diego; prof of polit. sci. College of William & Mary) The Perils of Multilateralism? American Influence in Multilateral Interventions,   
<http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/saideman/Delegation%20during%20Conflict%20APSA%2006.doc>

We argue that institutionalized multilateralism embodied in NATO procedures actually empowers the U.S., while also sharing burdens and providing international legitimacy. Our test case is the Kosovo conflict; the Bush administration’s poster child for all that is wrong with multilateral interventions. We show that the Kosovo conflict empowered the U.S. relative to its European partners through an understudied type of principal-agent relationship between NATO military commanders and their civilian superiors. In this context, military commanders are the agents of two principals; one an international organization (IO) with informal, norm-based decision rules and the other a powerful member state possessing the ability to act either independently or within the IO. In principal-agent parlance, the military agent reported to two principals, one a collective principal (the North Atlantic Council) and the other a single principal (the U.S. government) that was also a member of the collective principal. We argue that such hybrid principal-agent relationships actually provide advantages to powerful states like the U.S. when participating in multilateral interventions; advantages that offset most of the bargaining costs and the requirements for compromise within NATO. This paper contributes to a variety of current academic and policy debates. We describe and reinterpret the conventional wisdom regarding the chain of command within international organizations involved in multilateral interventions. To date, no one has explored the implications of the hybrid principal-agent relationships found in NATO for U.S. influence during the Kosovo conflict. From a practitioner’s perspective, these insights are progressively more relevant, as both homeland defense and the use of force increasingly involve both international organizations and individual states in a variety of chains of command. By studying the management of military operations by international organizations, we can offer informed advice to NATO policy makers as they seek to improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of their operations around the world, including the ongoing NATO operations in Afghanistan. The implication of our argument for the U.S. is more concrete. NATO interventions should not be feared. Instead, understanding patterns of civil-military relations in NATO suggests that the U.S. can better pursue its interests using the alliance then it can by acting unilaterally.

Impact 3: Today’s transatlantic community is indispensable for managing multiple world problems.

Philip H. Gordon 2012. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs) Remarks at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC March 1, 2012 “The United States and Europe: Meeting Global Challenges**”** <https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2012/185064.htm>

The agenda that is still before us, most urgently the rapidly deteriorating security situation in Syria, clearly remains daunting. And of course there are many many other issues that I haven’t had time here to address, from helping North Africa and the Middle East in its democratic transition, the question of China’s emerging power, new leadership in North Korea, climate change, the threat posed by Somali pirates off the Horn of Africa and many many others. But I think by talking a little bit about the extensive list of areas where we are cooperating extraordinarily closely, and contrasting it, if you will, to previous periods, and I don’t mean just the previous years but even decades before that, I think it says a lot about the approach that the President brought to this relationship, what we’ve been trying to do over the past three years, and what we intend to do in the future. On every single one of the issues I mentioned, close transatlantic cooperation is an indispensable starting point. To retain an effective working relationship, countries on both sides of the Atlantic must continue, as we have done, to engage in frank dialogue, smart defense spending, and cooperative policy-making. Secretary Clinton could not have summed it up more succinctly than she did in a joint appearance with Secretary of Defense Panetta in Munich just last month when she said, “Today's transatlantic community is not just a defining achievement of the century behind us. It is indispensable to the world we hope to build together in the century ahead.”

Impact: Increased risk of war. U.S. military power maintains world order and reduces the chance of war.

Dr. Michael Mandelbaum 2006. (Christian A. Herter Professor of American Foreign Policy; Director of the American Foreign Policy Program, Ph.D., Harvard University), January 20th, 2006, "David's Friend Goliath," ForeignPolicy.com, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/davids_friend_goliath>

For instance, U.S. military power helps to keep order in the world. The American military presence in Europe and East Asia, which now includes approximately 185,000 personnel, reassures the governments of these regions that their neighbors cannot threaten them, helping to allay suspicions, forestall arms races, and make the chances of armed conflict remote. U.S. forces in Europe, for instance, reassure Western Europeans that they do not have to increase their own troop strength to protect themselves against the possibility of a resurgent Russia, while at the same time reassuring Russia that its great adversary of the last century, Germany, will not adopt aggressive policies.

3. Loss of Multilateralism & Legitimacy

**When the US works through and with NATO in multilateral operations (instead of going on our own, i.e. "unilaterally"), we have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the rest of the world. This allows us to accomplish foreign policy objectives that we otherwise would not be able to achieve. An international consensus will have more political support and less resistance and opposition than the U.S. imposing its will on the rest of the world.**

Link: Withdrawal from NATO is bad because unilateral actions lack legitimacy - NATO is the best multilateral option

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson 2011. (Army Joint Intelligence Coordination Staff) “Defending NATO Distance learning” ARMED FORCES JOURNAL <http://armedforcesjournal.com/defending-nato-distance-learning/>

Third, Meyers suggests “the U.S. may withdraw from NATO altogether” over concerns about disproportionate burden sharing. Broadly speaking, the U.S. can choose from several foreign policy approaches when dealing with geopolitical challenges: a unilateral approach, a regional alliance approach, or a multilateral approach (i.e., working through the United Nations). Where a unilateral approach often lacks international legitimacy, consensus in a multilateral approach is frequently difficult to achieve. In many instances, a regional alliance approach, such as NATO, offers the best option. NATO has been an extremely successful military alliance for over 60 years. Further, it is an effective alliance today as it faces adversaries on multiple fronts. We should focus our energy on finding ways to strengthen the NATO alliance in order to better face the potential threats of tomorrow.

Link: NATO confers legitimacy on military operations

Dr. James Joyner 2011. (Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Alabama) “Back in the Saddle” 15 Apr 2011 FOREIGN POLICY <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/15/back_in_the_saddle>

In truth, however, the political value in a NATO operation is that the alliance's name is a stand-in for the developed world and operating under its name confers a legitimacy that national flags don't. This is particularly the case for Britain and France, whose colonial histories bring enormous baggage in the Middle East and North Africa -- not to mention the United States, with its own more recent complicated history in the region. With the notable exception of Russia, NATO does not have imperialistic connotations. In its 62 years of operation, the alliance has deployed its might sparingly: humanitarian protection missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Libya; maritime missions against the Somali pirates; and fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. While not all uncontroversial, these operations all had widespread international approval. This is not insignificant.

Brink: We can't have effective multilateral foreign policy without NATO

Ronald Asmus 2010. (Executive Director of the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center; Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) May/June 2010 FOREIGN POLICY magazine, "Who Needs NATO?" <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/26/who_needs_nato> (Carl von Clausewitz was a 19th century German military strategy expert and a general in the Prussian army)

The United States is in NATO today because it is a power that shares values and interests with Europe. There is no effective multilateralism without Atlanticism. If the United States withdraws from NATO, it will simply find itself with fewer allies and more instability. You don't need to be Carl von Clausewitz to understand why that is not a good outcome.

Impact: Solutions to nuclear proliferation and terrorism require legitimacy

Suzanne Nossel 2007. (Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and the Century Foundation and previously served as deputy to the Ambassador for UN Management and Reform at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations) “Going Legit” DEMOCRACY: A Journal of Ideas, Winter 2007, <https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/3/going-legit/>

While the United States remains preeminent in its military and economic strength, the most potent global challenges it faces–nuclear proliferation, terrorism, failed states, and the scramble for energy–are not amenable to resolution through money or firepower. They depend on America’s ability to forge agreements, build consensus, and persuade others, all of which in turn are contingent on whether Washington enjoys international legitimacy.

Definition of legitimacy

Suzanne Nossel 2007. (Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and the Century Foundation and previously served as deputy to the Ambassador for UN Management and Reform at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations) “Going Legit” DEMOCRACY: A Journal of Ideas, Winter 2007, <https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/3/going-legit/>

International legitimacy is a measure of the acceptability and justifiability of a state’s actions in the eyes of other states and their citizens. Legitimacy, a kind of moral capital, reflects a collective judgment that the assertion of power, through a policy or an action, is valid even if it is unpopular. After all, leadership requires taking the occasional unpopular stand; but whereas popularity is inherently ephemeral, contingent on personalities and temporary alignments of interest, legitimacy is more enduring. It provides a foundation for respect and understanding that can transcend short-term, conflicting goals. Practically, when America’s purposes are well-founded, openly articulated, and broadly consistent with its professed values, the use of power toward those ends is generally judged legitimate. But when the United States misleads others about its motives, acts on inadequate or selective evidence, flouts its own principles, or unilaterally exempts itself from broadly agreed standards of conduct, its legitimacy suffers.

4. Friendly Fire.

Coordination with NATO improves cooperation with allies, which means less risk of friendly-fire during war time

Dr. James Joyner 2011. (Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Alabama) “Back in the Saddle” 15 Apr 2011 FOREIGN POLICY <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/15/back_in_the_saddle>

Though NATO's bureaucracy is a favorite butt of jokes by even the alliance's staunchest supporters, its existence provides a massive head start. As a standing alliance, NATO has been the main venue for making sure that different countries' command structures and systems can work together, creating standard operating procedures, and ensuring a degree of uniformity in weapons and equipment. The commencement of a war is a really awful time to work these issues out, as we saw in the first Gulf War and its numerous friendly-fire incidents.

5. Risk to the Global Commons.

**“Global commons” are areas that are not under the jurisdiction of any government, like the high seas or outer space.**

Link: US+NATO needed to protect the global commons

Prof. James Sperling 2011. (Professor of Political Science at Akron University, Ohio) June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World “NATO and the Global Commons: A Perspective on Emerging Challenges, <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_hr.pdf>

The four domains constituting the global commons—aerospace, maritime space, cyberspace and outer space—are inextricably linked, but cyberspace and outer space are the two domains underpinning NATO’s ability to operate globally on air, land and sea. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has employed the language of ‘collective action’ and ‘collective goods’ as the foundation for NATO participation in shaping future access to the commons in each domain. Yet the objectives of the alliance (and particularly those of its senior partner, the United States) clearly underscore the continuing importance and desirability of sustaining the NATO (and American) sponsored regimes governing the commons or ensuring that any modification of those regimes does not harm the interests of the Alliance or its member States.

Impact: Protection of the open seas is critical to prosperity and security. Advanced economies are vulnerable to any maritime disruption

Prof. James Sperling 2011. (Professor of Political Science at Akron University, Ohio) June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World “NATO and the Global Commons: A Perspective on Emerging Challenges, <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_hr.pdf>

The maritime commons domain has the longest history as a sovereign-free domain facilitating commerce and conquest. Trading nations have had an asymmetrical interest in freedom of the seas to ensure the uninterrupted flow of trade, just as maritime powers have valued freedom of seas to facilitate the projection of power. In some cases, there has been a marriage of convenience between trading nations and maritime powers, while in others the maritime powers are states with a major interest in protecting global trade. The globalization of national economies has effectively rendered this distinction moot, but has reinforced the criticality of open seas for prosperity and security. The maritime commons domain retains an unparalleled security salience: the global and Atlantic economies are heavily dependent on sea-borne trade for manufactures and raw materials, and three quarters of global trade passes through vulnerable international straits and canals. The evolution of the global supply chain, particularly the manufacturing sector’s near universal reliance on just-in-time inventory management, has made the advanced economies particularly vulnerable to any disruption of maritime trade.

6. WMD’s and Terrorism.

Europe would be more vulnerable to WMDs and terrorism, regardless of their defense spending, because without NATO they lose access to US technological cooperation

Dr. Hans Binnendijk & Dr. Richard Kugler in 2003. (Binnendijk - PhD in international relations; Vice President for Research at National Defense University, Director and Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology and National Security Policy . Kugler - PhD, Distinguished Research Professor in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense Univ.) Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, <http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/2003/11/01/dh-035-dual-track-transformation-for-the-atlantic-alliance/> (WMD = weapons of mass destruction)

“Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift, and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.”

7. Negative net benefits / All harms get worse

Net benefits overwhelmingly favor US staying in NATO. All the complaints about Europe and defense get worse without NATO

Kori Schake 2017. (research fellow at the Hoover Institution and teaches at Stanford) NATO Without America?25 May 2017 <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/05/25/nato-without-america/>

However, NATO’s fundamental bargain continues to be overwhelmingly advantageous to the United States. European states would be both less willing and less able to help us without NATO. European allies would likely spend even less—not more—on defense without the constant hectoring of the United States within NATO. They would likely spend more on military pay and benefits than on high-end weapons and capabilities; all Western militaries must contend with competing demands on their funding, but the problem is more effectively addressed in NATO, where militaries have greater political capital to make hard choices than in solely national or EU forums. They would not be nearly as able to get organized and act decisively for a common purpose when needed.

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